Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in Missouri by Sutter, W. F.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 1 Winter 1965 Article 13 
Winter 1965 
Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in Missouri 
W. F. Sutter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. F. Sutter, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in Missouri, 30 MO. L. REV. (1965) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss1/13 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Comments
APPORTIONMENT OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX IN MISSOURI
I. THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Congress has imposed the federal estate tax on the transfer of the taxable
estate of a decedent to his distributee.1 It is an excise tax on the transfer of property
to a distributee and is independent of receipt of the transferred property by those
who share in the estate.2
The federal estate tax is distinguished from succession or inheritance taxes
which are imposed on the privilege of receiving or taking property rather than
upon transfer at death,8 and the executor of the decedent's estate is personally
liable for the payment of the inheritance tax from the estate before distribution.'
Likewise, the executor of the estate is liable for payment of the federal estate
tax,5 and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent, the tax is ordinarily
paid out of the estate before its distribution
Early cases treated the federal estate tax merely as another debt of the
decedent to be paid out of the residue of his estate.7 This rule of non-apportion-
ment was applied mechanically and with very little or no consideration for various
hardships imposed by the tax.8 Justification for the rule was based on erroneous
construction of the federal estate tax provisions making the executor liable for
payment of the tax, these provisions were thought to indicate congressional in-
tent to impose the tax on the residue of the estate.9
Frequent inequitable and unjust enrichment of some beneficiaries at the ex-
1. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §§ 2001-2207. The original federal estate tax act
is found in 39 Stat. 777 (1916).
2. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); Priedeman v. Jamison, 356 Mo.
627, 202 S.W.2d 900 (1947).
3. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Becker, 76 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1935); Priede-
man v. Jamison, supra note 2; In re McKinney's Estate, 351 Mo. 718, 173 S.W.2d
898 (1943); In re Rosing's Estate, 337 Mo. 544, 85 S.W.2d 495 (En Banc 1935).
4. §§ 145.120, .130, RSMo 1959; In re McKinney's Estate, supra note 3;
In re Rosing's Estate, supra note 3.
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2002, 2203, 2204, 2205; Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1
(1954), as amended, T.D. 6600, 1962-1 CUM. BULL. 164.
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2205; Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945);
Riggs v. Del Drago, supra note 2.
7. In re Holmes' Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40 S.W.2d 616 (1931); In re Hamlin,
226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass.
471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919); ATKINSoN, LAW OF WILLs 615, 708 (1st ed. 1937).
8. Ibid.
9. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Becker, supra note 3; In re Hamlin, supra
note 7; Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., supra note 7. See generally, Lauritzen,
Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 1 T. CouN. Q. 55, 62-67 (1957).
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pense of others prompted the state of New York to enact the first state apportion-
ment statute, providing that the federal estate tax burden be "equitably prorated"
among all of the beneficiaries interested in the assets of the estate that were sub-
ject to tax in an amount proportionate to their beneficial interests, unless the
decedent directed otherwise in his will." This statute was held to be constitutional
in the landmark case of Biggs v. Del Drago," which put to rest the erroneous
theory requiring the residuary estate to pay all the federal estate tax. Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court held that Congress intended the tax to be paid
out of the whole estate before its distribution, and that state law, with two
statutory exceptions, should govern the ultimate thrust of the tax.' 2 The two
exceptions are recipients of insurance proceeds payable to a beneficiary other
than the estate,13 and recipients of property over which the decedent had a power
of appointment.- But in all cases, including the two exceptions, a testator may in
his will place the burden of the tax where he wishes.15
Since the Del Drago case the trend has definitely been in favor of equitable
apportionment of the federal estate tax. At least twenty-two states have enacted
apportionment statutes,1 while other states,' 7 including Missouri,' 8 have adopted
equitable apportionment by judicial decree. Only one state has legislated specifically
against apportionment.'9 There have been proposals to adopt a uniform estate
tax apportionment act,20 and also a federal apportionment act.2 The prime pur-
10. N. Y. DECED. EST. LAW, § 124 (1930). See Scoles and Stephens, The Pro-
posed Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 43 MINN. L. REV. 907 (1959).
11. Supra note 2.
12. Riggs v. Del Drago, supra note 2; Fernandez v. Wiener, supra note 6; Car-
penter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954); Saracino v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 254 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. 1952); In re Poe's Estate, 356 Mo. 276,
201 S.W.2d 441 (1947).
13. INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 826(c), 53 Stat. 128 (now INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 2206).
14. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 826(d), 53 Stat. 128 (now INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 2207).
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2206, 2207; Riggs v. Del Drago, supra note 2;
St. 'Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger, 377 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
16. FED. EST. & GIFr TAx REP., ff 2490.16 (1964). For a collection of cases
construing and applying statutes concerning prorating the federal estate tax,
see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 199 (1954).
17. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918
(1951); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1951); Bragdon
v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1959); In re Barnhart's Estate, 102 N.H.
519, 162 A.2d 168 (1960); In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317
(1953); McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952);
Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959). For a collection of cases
discussing the ultimate burden of the federal estate tax in absence of statute or
will provision, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 169 (1954).
18. Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra note 12, discussed in Taxation--Equitable
Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax on Non-Probate Property, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q.
89.
19. ALA. COPE tit. 51, § 449(1) (1940) (as amended by Act 291, Acts of
1951).
20. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, 219-226 (1958); REvISED UNIFORM ESTATE TAX APPORTION-
MENT ACT, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
[Vol. 30
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pose behind both proposed acts is to provide uniform treatment of the tax and
to avoid numerous conflicts of laws problems. 22
II. APPORTIONMENT IN MISSOURI
Apportionment of the federal estate tax among beneficiaries who share in the
estate has had a slow development in Missouri. An early case, In re Holmes
Estate,28 decided before the Del Drago decision, adopted the old rule of non-
apportionment that in the absence of a will provision otherwise directing payment,
the residuary legatee should bear the burden of the tax. The will in that case pro-
vided for certain specific bequests, and the residue was to go to testatrix's sons;
it did not direct what funds or assets were to be used to pay the federal estate
tax or any other charges against the estate. Disregarding any unfairness arising in
the case, the court stated:
"[In the absence of a definite direction on the subject it must be pre-
sumed that the intention was that the ultimate weight" of the tax as a
charge against the estate must rest where the law of this state relating
to the administration of estates of deceased persons places it. [residue] If
it be claimed that inequalities will result, that must be assumed to
have been contemplated by the testatrix.24
The harshness of the burden-on-the residue rule was readily apparent in In re
Bernkeimer's Estate,25 in which a testatrix provided by will that her son receive
all property owned by her at her death, except all stocks and bonds which
she bequeathed to others. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's decision that under rules of abatement of legacies the federal estate tax
should first exhaust the son's bequest which included jewelry, furs and cash in
an amount less than the tax. The supreme court disregarded technical distinc-
tions between "general" and "specific" bequests. Holding the bequest to the
son was no more "general" or "specific" than the other bequests, the court sub-
stituted a rule of apportionment to impose the tax ratably. The reasoning of
the court was that since there was no express residuary clause to bear the
burden of the tax, the testatrix, a successful business woman familiar with the
federal estate tax, must have overlooked its allocation while executing her will.
Further, the court thought she probably intended the two bequests to "stand as
equals," and to bear "proportionately" and "ratably" the federal estate tax and
administration expenses. This result made it possible to pay substantially both
State Laws, August 8, 1964; approved by the American Bar Association, August
13, 1964. For a comprehensive analysis in favor of a uniform law, see Powell,
Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 327; Scoles and
Stephens, supra note 10; Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1282 (1951).
21. Note, Proposal for Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 30 hD. L.J.
217 (1955).
22. Ibid; see materials cited in note 20; Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate
Taxes and Conflicts of Laws, 55 COLUM. L. Ray. 261 (1955).
23. In re Holmes' Estate, supra note 7.
24. Id. at 150, 40 S.W.2d at 619.
25. In re Bernheimer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 176 S.W.2d 15 (1943).
1965] - 105
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gifts, thus carrying out the provisions of the will without extinguishing the be-
quest to the son.
Although the Bernheimer case apportioned the federal estate tax, not until
Carpenter v. Carpenter2- did the Missouri Supreme Court adopt equitable appor-
tionment as a rule of law. The case involved an annuity contract 27 payable to
the testator's wife as primary beneficiary and two sons as contingent beneficiaries.
The annuity contract did not pass under the will, and was therefore non-probate
(non-testamentary) property; nevertheless, it was included in the testator's
"gross estate" for federal estate tax purposes. The question confronting the court
was whether the ultimate burden of the tax attributable to the value of the an-
nuity contract should be borne by the wife or by the probate estate and
charged against the residuary legatees, including the wife and two sons. The
will contained a provision that federal estate and other taxes be paid out
of the estate "so that any bequest may be as free as possible from liens on
account of any such taxes"; however, no reference was made to payment of
that portion of the tax attributable to the annuity contract passing to the
wife independent of the will. After an excellent analysis of estate tax appor-
tionment in other states, the court rejected the general rule recognized by many
states at that time:
[T]hat in the absence of an apportionment statute or testamentary
provision to the contrary, the ultimate burden of the federal estate tax
is not apportioned, pro rata among all the devisees, legatees or other
recipients of the property included in the taxable estate, but rests on
the general estate and thus ultimately falls on the residuary estate.28
Instead the court chose to decide the case on equitable principles:
Prorating the federal estate tax . . between the testamentary estate
and the non-testamentary estate seems to provide a fair and impartial
basis for distribution of the tax burden . . . where the testator in his will
has not . . . otherwise provided except as to devises and bequests under
the will. We have seen that there is nothing in the federal estate tax
statutes to prevent a proper application of equitable principles to pre-
vent injustice, where the tax is based upon both testamentary and non-
testamentary property.29
Equitable apportionment was applied in Missouri to prorate the federal
estate tax attributable to an inter vivos trust among the trust beneficiaries in
accordance with their respective interests in the trust.80 The will did not contain
26. Supra note 12. The first leading case to adopt equitable apportionment
was Hampton's Adm'rs v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920).
27. Powell, supra note 20 sets out other non-probate assets which include life
insurance, assets over which the decedent has some type of power of appointment,
gifts in contemplation of death, inter vivos trust property, and jointly held property
with right of survivorship.
28. Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra note 12, at 792, 267 S.W.2d at 639, citing
47 C.J.S., INTERNAL REVENUE § 776 (1946). Also see Rogan v. Taylor, 136 F.2d
598 (9th Cir. 1943); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1220 (1951).
29. Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra note 12, at 797, 267 S.W.2d at 642.
30. Sebree v. Rosen, 349 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1961).
(Vol. 30
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a provision with regard to the payment of the tax. Since the inter vivos
trust corpus passed outside the will, it was non-probate property which was,
however, included in the "gross estate" for estate tax purposes. There is some
risk involved in cases of testamentary apportionment, in absence of a statute
specifically providing for apportionment to non-probate assets, that the testa-
mentary apportionment is ineffective against assets which the testator no longer
owned at his death.31 Problems in this area are complicated by divergent conflicts
of law rules among the various states.32
The Bernteimer case left unanswered the question whether equitable appor-
tionment would be applicable in a case involving a will containing no tax clause,
but which unambiguously set forth "general" and "specific" bequests. Some
guidance may be found in the dictum contained in the Carpenter case setting
forth the order of abatement for an executor to follow as he uses the assets
in his possession to pay the federal estate tax:
[Hie has to pay it out of the probate estate generally and, more
particularly, if there is a residuary estate, out of that estate until it
has been exhausted, and, if there is no residuary estate or it has been so
exhausted, it must be paid out of the "general" legacies to the exclusion
of "specific" legacies. And, as between real and personal property, pay-
ment must be made out of the personal estate until it is exhausted. These
rules concern only the initial method of paying the tax and from what
property it shall be paid. They do not concern the matter of the ultimate
liability to pay the tax or any right of the estate to reimbursement for
that portion of the tax attributable to non-probate property included
in the "gross estate" for federal estate tax purposes.33
However, the St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger- case (discussed infra)
specifically held that if a will is involved, equitable apportionment has no applica-
tion. Determination of the federal estate tax burden is fundamentally a matter of
intention based upon construction of the will. The abatement statute may
have some application, but it is "subject to the provisions of the will."35
Presently in Missouri equitable apportionment has its greatest impact on
estates which involve the marital deduction. A question of major significance
is whether a surviving spouse who renounces the deceased spouse's will takes
the amount of the marital deduction 36 free of any burden to pay federal estate
tax on the share taken.
In Hammond v. Wheeler,37 a wife elected to take a statutory share against
31. United States v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958); Warfield v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 337 Mass. 14, 147 N.E.2d 809 (1958).
32. Scoles, supra note 22.
33. Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra note 12, at 791, 267 S.W.2d at 638. Also
see the abatement statute, § 473.620, RSMo 1959.
34. Supra note 15.
35. § 473.620, RSMo 1959.
36. Irrr. REv. CODE of 1939 § 812(e) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056).
37. Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961). See also Lincoln
Bank & Trust Co. supra note 17. But see Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green,
236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
19651
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her husband's will under the then applicable election statute, all of which
qualified for the marital deduction. The court concluded that in order to take
full advantage of the Congressional purpose behind the marital deduction to
enable states to provide for equality in taxation among the residents of com-
munity property states and non-community property states the wife should
be exonerated from payment of any federal estate tax on property received
by her which did not contribute to any part of the tax. The court did re-
quire the wife to pay that portion of the tax allocable to other property re-
ceived by her which was included in the taxable estate. The same result was
reached in Jones v. Jones,39 in which a surviving spouse renounced her husband's
will under the current election statute.40 There has been one federal court case'.
involving a Missouri decedents estate in which a proportionate share of the fed-
eral estate tax was deducted from that portion of the estate passing to the re-
nouncing spouse; however, the case was decided before the Hammond and
Jones cases and its authoritative value would seem to be of little significance
at the present time.
The trend in favor of exonerating marital deduction bequests from the fed-
eral estate tax burden as set forth in the Hammond and Jones cases has been
limited by the very recent St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger4 2 case, holding
that the federal estate tax and other charges against a testatrix's estate must
be deducted from the gross value of the estate before computing the portion of
the estate to go by will to the estate of the husband who died thirteen months
after the testatrix. The will provided for a general bequest of one-half of the
estate to go to the testatrix's husband if living, and if he should predecease her,
his share of the estate was to go to a nephew who was also the residuary legatee.
The court distinguished Hammond and Jones on the basis that in those cases no
will was involved since the surviving spouse renounced it. The will in the St.
Louis Union Trust case did not contain an express provision directing payment
of the federal estate tax; notwithstanding, the court concluded that the will
38. § 469.090(2), RSMo 1949, repealed, Mo. LAws 1955, at 385, § A. This
statute provided that the wife receive "one-half of the real and personal estate
belonging to the husband at the time of his death, absolutely, subject to the pay-
ment of the husband's debts." In Hammond v. Wheeler, supra note 37, the fed-
eral estate tax was held not to be "debt" within the meaning of this statute, and
it was not deducted before the wife received her share. See Guaranty Nat'l Bank
v. Mitchell, 144 W. Va. 828, 111 S.E.2d 494 (1959), holding that a renouncing
spouse takes the share after estate taxes which the court placed in the same cate-
gory as "debts" and other administration expenses within that state's statute gov-
erning renunciations.
39. Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
40. § 474.160, RSMo 1959. Jones v. Jones, supra note 39 held that a surviving
spouse who elects to take against the will becomes an "heir" under the election
statute and not under the general intestate statute.
41. Traders Nat'l Bank v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
The widow elected to take commuted dower and homestead rights which qualified
for the marital deduction, but the amount of the share was reduced -by a propor-
tionate amount equal to 37.13 per cent of the federal estate tax on the entire
estate; FED. EST. & GiFrt TAX REP., 1 2490.15 (1964).
42. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger, sv-pra note 15.
[Vol. 30
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alone was decisive of the question presented and the doctrine of equitable
apportionment was not applicable. Construing the whole will, the court found
the testatrix's intention was that a!l charges, including the federal estate tax,
be paid by the executors before the net estate was to be distributed. The will
provided for the portion of the estate bequeathed to the husband to pass to a
nephew if the husband predeceased the testatrix. If the husband had in fact
predeceased the wife there would have been no marital deduction and the share
passing to the nephew could only be a share of the net estate after payment of
all charges against the estate, but such was not the case since the husband died
thirteen months after the testatrix. It is difficult to understand how the gift
over provision (such as appears in any well drafted will) to the nephew in-
dicated the intention of the testatrix that her husband, if he survived her, was
to take only a share of the net estate. It would appear that the surviving spouse's
bequest should be determined as of the date of the testatrix's death, not with-
standing subsequent events. If the Missouri Supreme Court felt that the marital
deduction should be computed after deducting the federal estate tax it could have
better justified its decision on the reasoning of two recent federal court cases
involving Missouri decedents,43 or by reference to the federal statute.4
The St. Louis Union Trust Co. case held that a general bequest of one-half
the estate, which qualified for the marital deduction, should be computed on
the net estate after deducting the federal estate tax. But, in a case where a will
with no tax clause provides for a specific bequest or non-factional general
bequest which qualifies for the marital deduction, equitable apportionment
probably would not be applied to charge the marital deduction bequest with any
portion of the federal estate tax. However, the bequests may be affected by
abatement rules unless the will can be construed to show intention that the be-
quests not be burdened with any portion of the tax.
Another group of cases which may cause problems in Missouri arises when
there is a will with no tax clause and an estate containing non-probate
property45 which qualifies for the marital deduction. One approach to these
cases would be to apply equitable apportionment, and as in the Carpenter and
Sebree 4 6 cases, the surviving spouse would be charged with a proportionate
share of the federal estate tax. Another approach based on the Hammond and
Jones cases would be to exonerate the surviving spouse from any portion of the
tax burden on the non-probate property to the extent it qualified for the marital
deduction. The same result would be reached if the surviving spouse elected
to take against the will. The latter approach seems the better reasoned one in
43. Estate of Oliver B. Avery, 40 T.C. 392 (1963), on appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held for purposes of computing the marital deduc-
tion the share passing to the widow under the will must be reduced by a propor-
tional amount for the federal estate tax; Traders Nat'l Bank v. United States,
supra note 41.
44. INT. Ray. CoDE of 1954, § 2056(b)(4); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)(4)
(1954), as amended, T.D. 6600, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 164.
45. Powell, supra note 20.
46. Sebree v. Rosen, supra note 30.
1965]
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view of the fundamental Congressional purpose behind the marital deduction to
achieve tax equality between community and non-community property states.
In any event, drafting techniques specifically relieving the marital deduction
bequest from any federal estate tax burden would prevent or at least reduce
problems arising in this area.
Apportionment and marital deduction problems also arise in other jurisdic-
tions. It has been successfully argued, as in Missouri, that since property making
up the marital deduction is not subject to the federal estate tax, the surviving
spouse should bear no part of the tax.' 7 However, this view has been severely
criticized on the basis that property passing to the surviving spouse is not
exempt from the tax; rather, the estate is merely given a deduction equal to
the amount of marital deduction property in computing the tax.48 Under this
view the total tax is increased. Since the amount of the marital deduction is lim-
ited to the value of the property actually passing to the surviving spouse to the
extent the surviving spouse must contribute to the tax, the reduced deduction
creates an increase in the total tax.
Considering the results of the marital deduction cases in Missouri, it may, in
some instances, be advantageous for a surviving spouse to elect to take against a
marital deduction will bequeathing one-half of the estate to the surviving spouse
since the share is received undiminished by any portion of the federal estate tax.
Many problems arising in the apportionment area can be prevented if
proper will or trust provisions are drafted expressly and unequivocally stating the
testator's true intention regarding payment of the federal estate tax. Court ap-
proved language40 is difficult to locate and is many times inadequate for par-
ticular estate plans; thus, this area of drafting is a challenging undertaking for
an estate planner. A case of major significance in Missouri is Lipic v.
47. Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952), overruled,
Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954), but on the ground
that the Ohio statute giving the right to renounce prohibited freeing the surviving
spouse's share from the federal estate tax. See Sutter, How to Plan for AZportion-
ment of Estate Taxes, ESTATE TAx TECHNIQUES, 2158-2168, I (Lasser's ed. 1962).
48. Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538 (1960);
Lauritzen supra note 9, at 85-88.
49. Lauritzen, supra note 9, at 91 suggests the following clauses to provide for
most apportionment situations:
"I have been informed by my attorney of the problem of apportionment of
the Federal Estate Taxes on my estate. Having carefully considered this problem,
I hereby declare it to be my express intention that
(Complete Apportionment)
"(1) Such taxes shall be apportioned among those persons receiving the be-
quest of such portions of my estate as are finally determined to be subject to such
taxes.
(No Apportionment)
"(2) Such taxes shall not be apportioned but shall all be paid out of the
residue of my probate estate. (Partial Apportionment)
"(3) Such taxes applicable to the assets forming my probate estate shall be
paid out of the residue of my estate, but any such taxes assessed by reason of
property outside of my probate estate shall be apportioned among the persons
receiving the benefit of such property."
[Vol. 30
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WAieler 0 which involved an inter vivos trust. The testator's will was silent on
payment of taxes, but one provision of the trust instrument authorized the
trustees
to pay any and al taxes which may -be assessed against the property in-
cluded in this trust, whether state, municipal, federal, income or in-
heritance taxes, and to sell part of the trust property for such purpose. 1
(Emphasis added.)
Construing the provision, the court held the federal estate tax should be equitably
apportioned between the probate estate and the non-probate trust estate; that
when the settlor used the terms "any and all taxes," he meant "all taxes." 52
III. CONCLUSION
Federal estate tax consequences should always be considered before draft-
ing an estate plan. Since Missouri has no apportionment statute, a judicial
doctrine of equitable apportionment has been adopted. If a decedent dies
intestate there is no problem of apportionment, and the federal estate tax
is merely deducted from the estate before its distribution to the heirs. Equitable
apportionment has its clearest application in those cases requiring beneficiaries
of non-probate property, included in the gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes, to pay the amount of the tax attributable to their respective shares.
Marital deduction cases pose the unsettled apportionment problems in Mis-
souri. Two situations commonly arise. One involves the surviving spouse who
elects to take against he deceased spouse's will. Except in one federal case, 3
the surviving spouse has not been required to share in the payment of any por-
tion of the tax. The other involves a surviving spouse who takes a bequest which
qualifies for the marital deduction. The surviving spouse may receive the be-
quest only after it has been reduced by a proportionate amount of the tax. A
decision clarifying the effects of equitable apportionment on the marital deduc-
tion is badly needed.
The testator and lawyer should give serious consideration to the federal
estate tax, and the use of proper language cannot be over emphasized. Perhaps
most of the problems arising in this area can be minimized by drafting will or
other estate plan provisions expressly and unequivocally explaining the testator's
intentions regarding payment of the federal estate tax.
W. F. SUmrn
50. Lipic v. Wheeler, 362 Mo. 499, 242 S.W.2d 43 (1951).
51. Id. at 510, 242 S.W.2d at 49.
52. Ibid. The court said: "The very presence of the tax provision shows
Joseph Sr.'s intention to shift from his own estate some of the taxes for which
that estate would be liable on account of the trust assets. And we think he meantjust what he said--'any and all taxes."' See also Priedeman v. Jamison, supra
note 2.
53. Estate of Oliver B. Avery, supra note 43.
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